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A New Chapter in Missouri Percolating
Groundwater Law: The Non-Severability
of Water Rights From Land-
City of Blue Springs v. Central Development Association'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the State of Missouri may be rich in groundwater resources,
Missouri case law is decidedly barren in percolating groundwater decisions.
Only a handful of cases, including the instant one, address this area of water
law either directly or indirectly. For the past twenty years, no Missouri court
has dealt with this topic in the context of a dispute between adjoining
landowners over a shared water supply. Many questions remained unan-
swered, chief of which was whether water rights were severable from the land.
This Note will answer that question in the course of analyzing the most recent
Missouri court decision in this area.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Blue Springs, a fourth class municipal corporation, originally purchased
water for its citizens from the Missouri Water Company.2 In 1979, Missouri
Water informed Blue Springs that it would not renew its contract upon
expiration in 1990.' Blue Springs then began to seek a new water supply.
Central Development Association (CDA)4 held the title to a 6,000 acre
parcel of farmland northeast of Independence, Missouri, in the Atherton
Bottoms area.' An expansive water supply, composed of a deposit of alluvial
rocks, gravel, and sand filtering and retaining ground water, was located below
CDA's farmland.6 In 1981 Blue Springs declared its intention to condemn
CDA's land in the Atherton Bottoms.7
* The author wishes to thank Peter N. Davis, Isidor Loeb Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Columbia, for his helpful suggestions and comments.
1. 831 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) [hereinafter Blue Springs 11].
2. Id at 656.
3. Id
4. CDA is a Missouri corporation owned entirely by the Reorganized Church of
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In May 1982, Community Water Company (CWC) incorporated.'
Ninety-four percent of CWC's stock was held by CDA.9 In a subsurface
water deed, CDA transferred to CWC partial rights to the water under the
western 4,000 acres of the farmland.10 Under the deed, CDA reserved the
right to withdraw whatever water it needed for fanning." Furthermore,
CDA was to receive fifty-percent of the earnings from any water sales by
CWC. 2 At that time, CWC did not own any pipes, wells or a water
treatment plant.
13
In August 1982, Blue Springs initiated condemnation proceedings in the
Circuit Court of Jackson County against 49.83 acres of CDA's land. 4 The
trial court granted CDA's and CWC's joint motion to dismiss Blue Springs'
condemnation petition. 5 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District reversed the dismissal. 6  On remand, the trial court ordered






13. Id CWC has not acquired any pipes or wells, nor constructed a water
treatment plant. Id
14. Id Blue Springs wanted 34.12 acres for transmission lines and a water
treatment plant, and 15.71 acres for water wells. Id
15. Id Evidence was heard on the issue for three days. Id.
16. City of Blue Springs v. Central Dev. Ass'n, 684 S.W.2d 44, 51-52 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) [hereinafter Blue Springs 1].
17. In brief, a condemnation action proceeds as follows:
(1) Acting in good faith, the condemnor must try to purchase the land directly from
the condemnee.
(2) If no settlement can be reached, the condemnor files a petition for condemnation
in the circuit court of the county where the property is located, alleging the settlement
offer and refusal, a description of the land and the name(s) of the owner(s), the
statutory power to condemn, the use to which the land will be put, and a prayer for
the appointment of three commissioners.
(3) Ifthe condemnee does not challenge the condemnor's authority, three commission-
ers are appointed. They view the land and file a report assessing the amount of
damages.
(4) Either party may file exceptions to the commissioners' report, and if this is done,
a trial is held wherein damages are determined in an adversarial setting.
See Bradley J. Baumgart, Comment, Preliminary Requirements For Condemnation in
Missouri: Necessity, Public Use, and Good Faith Negotiations, 44 Mo. L. REV. 503,
504-05 (1979). See generally Mo. R. CiV. P. 86 (1993).
[Vol. 59
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$98,500.1" Blue Springs, CDA, and CWC filed exceptions to the
commissioners' report. 9
Prior to jury trial on the exceptions, Blue Springs moved to dismiss
CWC's exceptions2  Blue Springs also requested that the.court disallow the
presentation of evidence by CDA and CWC regarding the water's separate
value, any valuation of the land based on the income method, and the value
of CWC's interest in the land.2' The trial court denied Blue Springs' motion
to dismiss CWC's exceptions and made additional rulings that effectively
granted Blue Springs' request to exclude such evidence. 2
A jury trial from August 6-10, 1990, resulted in an award to CDA and
CWC of $100,000, and the court entered a judgment consistent with the
verdict on August 28, 1990.' The Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District affirmed the trial court's decision,24 holding that water is
not severable from the land under or through which it flows.' Therefore,
the value of the surface land and water rights would not be separately
appraised because the condemnor (Blue Springs) did not violate the compara-
18. Blue Springs II, 831 S.W.2d at 656.
19. Id at 656-57.
20. Id at 657.
21. Id
22. Id The exact rulings of the trial court were:
[1.] Any evidence of or discussion of the separate value of the water is
excluded. Counsel are directed not to discuss in any way a separate value
for the water in the presence of the venire or the jury;
[2.] The Jury will not be permitted to consider evidence based on the
income approach in its determination of the value of the partial taking of
this unimproved property;
[3.] The testimony of William Davis, Jr., is excluded;
[4.] Any evidence or testimony that relies on the conclusions of William
Davis, Jr., is excluded;
[5.] Both Community Water Company and the Central Development
Association may participate in the trial of the exceptions; and
[6.] Any evidence of the conveyance of water rights is excluded.
Ict (footnote omitted). William Davis Jr., CWC's expert witness, proposed to testify
on the separate value of CWC's water right. Id at n.1. Subsequently, Blue Springs
requested the court to exclude Keith Wilson Jr., an expert witness for CWC, because
he had not been so identified until one week before trial. Id at 657. As Wilson's
testimony would have been based on valuing the water separately, it was excluded.
Id
23. Id
24. Id at 662.
25. Id at 659.
3
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tive reasonableness rule for percolating groundwater allocation,26 and all
evidence and testimony regarding the severance of water rights and the water's
separate value was properly excluded.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The legal foundation upon which the Blue Springs II court relied in
reaching its. decision consists of Missouri eminent domain law, general
groundwater law principles, and Missouri groundwater case law. Each of
these areas will be discussed below.
.A. Missouri Eminent Domain Law
The Missouri Constitution provides that "private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. '28 Fourth class
cities have the condemnation powers pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes
sections 79.380 and 88.667.29
When property is physically appropriated, the landowner is immediately
entitled to compensation." Once it is established that a landowner is due
compensation, the landowner is entitled to "the market value of the land
actually taken [the direct damages], 31 and the consequential damages, if any,
to the remainder of the land caused by the taking."32 Consequential damages
are "any other damages that flow to the landowner as a consequence of the
taking."33
If only part of a tract of land is condemned, damages are equal to the
"difference between the fair market value of the entire property before the
taking and the fair market value after the taking."34 Furthermore, factors that
have "present quantifiable effect[s] on the market value of the property [are
properly considered as] element[s] of damages."35 There is a prohibition
against remote, speculative, and contingent damages that prevents landowners
26.Id
27. Id at 662.
28. MO. CONST. art I, § 26.
29. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 79.380, 88.867 (1986).
30. State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Horine, 776 S.W.2d
6, 10 (Mo. 1989).
31. Id at 10 & n.1.
32. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Long, 422 S'.W.2d 276, 278 (Mo.
1967) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Vasquez, 341 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Mo. 1960)).
33. Horine, 776 S.W.2d at 10 n.1.
34. Id at 12 (citation omitted).
35. Id (citations omitted).
[Vol. 59
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from "recovering for events that do not now, or may not ever, diminish the
market value of the land.
36
For valuation purposes, Missouri generally follows the undivided fee
rule,37 which provides that "where there are different interests or estates in
property taken by condemnation, the proper procedure is 'to ascertain the
entire compensation as though the property belonged to one person and then
apportion this sum among the different parties according to their respective
rights. ' ' 38  An exception, often called the separate valuation rule,39 is
recognized when, under exceptional circumstances, "damages to the various
interests when added together exceed the value of the property as a whole; in
such a case the particular interests should of course be separately appraised,
because the owner of each is entitled to be compensated in damages for the
amount of his interest taken.
40
Mineral deposits in condemned land generally are not valued separately,
but are considered as a factor that may augment the overall value of the
land.4' When there has been a severance of surface and mineral rights into
separate estates, two distinct property rights are created, each subject to
compensation under condemnation proceedings.42
There is an additional exceptionto the undivided fee rule, often called the
primary purpose rule.43 Under application of this rule, when a party has
specifically condepmned an identifiable portion of the property (i.e., mineral
deposits) without condemning the entire fee, evidence establishing the
36. Id (citations omitted). Additionally, the Missouri Supreme Court has stated:
Damages which are sought on the theory of injury to the remainder of
land after the taking of a part must be direct and certain at the time of the
appropriation and, conversely, not remote and speculative; and loss of
profits is usually regarded as too speculative and remote to be considered
as a basis for ascertaining the damages in a condemnation proceeding.
State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Salmark Home Builders, Inc., 375
S.W.2d 92, 98-99 (Mo. 1964) (citations omitted).
37. 4 PHILLIP NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAiN § 12.05[1] (1990).
38. State exrel. State Highway Comm'n v. Willis, 483 S.W.2d 599,603 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1972) (quoting State ex rel. McCaskill v. Hall, 28 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Mo. 1930),
and City of St. Louis v. Wabash R.R., 421 S.W.2d 302, 303-05 (Mo. 1967)).
39. See 4 NICHOLS, supra note 37, § 12.05[2].
40. State ex rel. McCaskill v. Hall, 28 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. 1930).
41. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Foeller, 396 S.W.2d 714, 719 (Mo.
1965).
42. Id This can be viewed as one of the "exceptional circumstances" that triggers
the separate valuation rule.
43. See 4 NICHOLS, supra note 37, § 13.22[1] (Supp. 1993). See also Greystone
Heights Redevelopment Corp. v. Nicholas Investment Co., Inc., 500 S.W.2d 292, 298
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973), for a discussion of the application of this exception.
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separate, compensable value of the fee portion may be introduced."
Conversely, when the entire fee is taken, evidence pertaining to the separate
value of the mineral deposits is allowable only to the extent it enhances the
overall property value.45
B. General Principles of Groundwater Law
Groundwater can be classified into two categories: underground streams
and percolating groundwater.46 Underground streams "flow[] in a fixed and
defined channel whose existence and location is known or ascertainable.1 47
Percolating groundwater "seeps, oozes, filters, and otherwise circulates through
subsurface strata without a defined channel. ',41 There is a legal presumption
that groundwaters are percolating, rebuttable by evidence establishing the
existence of an underground stream.49
Common law doctrines govern the allocation of water in surface
watercourses and groundwater in most eastern states, including Missouri."
Water allocation rules for underground streams follow the riparian doctrine for
surface watercourses.5 Water allocation rules for percolating groundwater
44. Greystone, 500 S.W.2d at 298. This is equivalent to the creation by
condemnation of a subsurface estate, and thus is just another very limited application
of the separate valuation rule.
45. Id
46. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.5 (1984). See
also Peter N. Davis, Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents for
Missouri?, 47 Mo. L. REV. 429, 439 (1982) [hereinafter Davis, Permit Statutes];
Rhonda Churchill Thomas, Note, Water Law-Groundwater Rights in Missouri-A
Needfor Clarification, 37 Mo. L. REV. 357, 358 (1972).
47. Davis, Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 439 n.41.
48. Davis, Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 439 n.44.
49. CuNIGHAM Er AL., supra note 46, § 7.4; Davis, PermitStatutes, supra note
46, at 440 n.44. Neither CDA nor CWC asserted that the underground water in the
Atherton Bottoms was an underground stream. Blue Springs 1H, 831 S.W.2d at 658.
50. Davis, Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 432.
51. Id at 439; CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 7.4. The reasonable use
rule of the riparian doctrine for surface watercourses allows a riparian to make any
reasonable use of the water so long as that use does not interfere with nor cause harm
to other riparians' reasonable uses. CUNMNGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 7.4; Davis,
Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 432-33. The reasonableness of any given use is
determined through a comparative evaluation of the conflicting uses. Id., at 433. A
nonexclusive list of factors for consideration can be found in Restatement (S6cond) of
Torts § 850A (1979). CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 7.4 n.8. The text of
§ 850A can be found infra text accompanying note 68.
[Vol. 59
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vary from state to state,52 but three53 principal doctrines are followed.
These doctrines are: (1) the absolute ownership rule; (2) the American
reasonable use rule; and (3) the comparative reasonableness rule.
The absolute ownership rule is often referred to as the English common
law rule.' Under the absolute ownership rule, percolating groundwater is
part of the land under which it is found; as such, it belongs absolutely to the
landowner, who may, without liability, withdraw as much as (s)he pleases,
regardless of any injurious consequences to adjoining landowners' water
supplies."
The instant case does not involve an underground stream. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the remainder of this Note will concentrate on
groundwater law as it pertains to percolating waters.
52. Davis, Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 439-41.
53. See Peter N. Davis, Federal and State Water Quality Regulation and Law in
Missouri, 55 Mo. L. REV. 414, 490-94 (1990) [hereinafter Davis, Water Quality];
Davis, Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 439-41; Thomas, supra note 46, at 359-60.
Thomas speaks of a fourth variation, the "California correlative rights" doctrine.
"Under this doctrine, the rights of all landowners over a common saturated area are co-
equal or correlative and one cannot use more than his proportional share, even for the
benefit of his own land, where the rights of others are injured by such use." Thomas,
supra note 46, at 361. See also CUNNINGHAM Er AL., supra note 46, § 7.5, which
recognizes the "California correlative rights" doctrine as a third theory for percolating
groundwater law. There, the second theory is the "American reasonable use" rule, but
the text mentions instances when courts have stretched this theory, and this seems to
refer to the comparative reasonableness rule. See also Davis, Permit Statutes, supra
note 46, at 441 n.49, which also (indirectly) refers to this rule.
Thomas, supra note 46, at 361 & n.25, also mentions a fifth variation, the "prior
appropriation" doctrine applied to percolating groundwater. This is primarily a
"Western" water law doctrine (as is the "California correlative rights" doctrine).
Neither will be discussed further in this Note.
54. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 7.5; Davis, Water Quality, supra note
53, at 491; Thomas, supra note 46, at 359 n.13. Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324,
152 ENG. REP. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843), is typically given credit for the establishment of
this rule. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 7.5; Davis, Water Quality, supra
note 53, at 491 n.632; Thomas, supra note 46, at 359. However, two Missouri cases
recognize that much the same result was previously reached in Greenleaf v. Francis,
35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 177 (1836). See Blue Springs I, 831 S.W.2d at 658 n.2; Higday
v. Nicholaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 865 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
55. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., supra note 46, § 7.5; Davis, Water Quality, supra note
53, at 491; Davis, Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 440; Thomas, supra note 46, at
359. There is a limitation on this rule based on malice and waste. CUNNINGHAM ET
AL., supra note 46, § 7.5; Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 491; Davis, Permit
Statutes, supra note 46, at 440; Thomas, supra note 46, at 359-60.
7
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American courts began moving away from the absolute ownership rule
toward more equitable solutions, in part because the original justifications for
this rule were less applicable, 6 and in part because of dissatisfaction with the
harsh results it produced."
The American rule is more often called the "reasonable use" groundwater
rule. It allows a landowner to make any use of the underlying groundwa-
ter, so long as that use is on or related to the overlying land." As with the
absolute ownership rule, the landowner does not incur liability for damages
to adjoining landowners' water supplies.' In this context, reasonableness
hinges more on the nature of the use and the relationship of that use with the
overlying land.
The comparative reasonableness rule6' is also called the (eastern)'
correlative rights rule.63 It is often confused with the American rule when
that rule is labeled the "reasonable use" rule.' Under the comparative
reasonableness rule, a landowner may make any use of the percolating
groundwater, so long as that use does not unreasonably impair adjoining
56. Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 491; Thomas, supra note 46, at 359-
60.
57. Blue Springs II, 831 S.W.2d at 658; Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 865; Davis,
Water Quality, supra note 53, at 492.
58. Blue Springs 1, 831 S.W.2d at 658; Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 865;
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 7.5; Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at
492-93; Thomas, supra note 46, at 360. This should not be confused with the
reasonable use rule of the riparian doctrine for surface watercourses and underground
streams, discussed supra note 51. The similarity in nomenclature is often confusing
to courts. Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 493 & nn.641-42; Davis, Permit
Statutes, supra note 46, at 440-41 & n.49; Thomas, supra note 46, at 360-62. Hougan
v. Milwaukee & St. P. R.R., 35 Iowa 558 (1872), was the first case to adopt this rule.
See Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 492 n.638. Because of the nomenclature
problem, see injra note 66, Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862), is
sometimes given credit for first enunciating this rule. See Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 865
n.4; CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 7.5. But Bassett is more accurately
credited with enunciating the comparative reasonableness rule. See infra note 63 and
accompanying text.
59. Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 492.
60. Id
61. Id at 493-94.
62. Davis, Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 441-42.
63. Thomas, supra note 46, at 360. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569
(1862), was the first case to enunciate this rule. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46,
§ 7.5; Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 494 n.646.
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landowners' water supplies." In this context, reasonableness relates more to
the quantity of one landowner's use in comparison with the rights and needs
of adjoining landowners." The Restatement (Second) of Torts'7 adopts this
approach, and lists factors that should be considered to determine if the use
is "reasonable":
(a) The purpose of the use,
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake,
(c) the economic value of the use,
(d) the social value of the use,
(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes,
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use
or method of use of one proprietor or the other,
(g) the practicality -f adjusting the quantity of water used by
each proprietor,
(h) the protection of existing values of water uses, lands,
investments and enterprises, and
(i) the justice of requiring the user causing the harm to bear
the losS."
The Restatement (Second) does not distinguish between surface watercourses
and groundwater in the application of this rule.69
C. Missouri Groundwater Case Law70
Springfteld Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins7' was the first Missouri case to
deal with percolating groundwater in the context of a dispute between
adjoining landowners. There, the plaintiff water company owned land
65. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 866; Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 493-94;
Davis, Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 441; Thomas, supra note 46, at 360.
66. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 866; Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 494;
Thomas, supra note 46, at 360 & n.23. Because of the "balancing" or comparison
approach it adopts, this rule is analogous to the reasonable use rule of the riparian
doctrine for surface watercourses. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. This
similarity adds more confusion to the nomenclature problem. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).
68. Id.
69. Ie § 858 cmt. d. See also CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 7.5 n.1.
70. For an excellent review of Missouri water law in general, see Peter N. Davis,
Missouri, in 6 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 237-49 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp.
1993).
71. 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895).
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containing a spring from which the water was diverted into a reservoir for
storage, and later sold to the city of Springfield.2 The defendants owned
land adjoining the plaintiff's that contained two convergent springs which the
defendants dammed to form a pond.73 Plaintiff claimed that its spring was
fed by an underground stream, which in turn was fed by the river previously
created by the undammed convergence of defendants' springs.74 Plaintiff
further alleged that the defendants' frequent and unnecessary draining of the
pond during the summer months reduced the water pressure to the point that
no water seeped out to feed plaintiff's spring."
The court found the evidence insufficient to support the plaintiff's
"underground stream" theory and therefore concluded that the riparian doctrine
for surface watercourses did not apply to protect the natural flow. 76 The
court thus turned to percolating groundwater rules.77 The court ultimately
held that the defendants, although retaining the right to maintain their dam and
drain the pond for purposes of repair, were enjoined from draining the pond
in the summer months "when [to do so] would result in material damage to
the plaintiff."78 This, the court said, was "not an unreasonable restraint.7 9
The Springfield Waterworks court's summarization of the then-applicable
groundwater rules" has been interpreted as applying the English absolute
ownership rule.8  At least one Missouri cour' and one commentator, 83
.72. Id at 77.
73. Id. at 77-78.
74. Id at 78.
75. Id
76. Id at 80.
77. Id.
78. Id at 84.
79. Id
80. The court stated:
[Percolating groundwater] is regarded as a part of the soil and to which an
adjoining proprietor has no absolute or natural right, and to which he can
acquire no prescriptive right. It belongs to the owner of the land, and its
diversion or appropriation by him for the improvement or benefit of his
estate can not be made the basis of complaint against him by anyone,
however grievous the resulting injury may be.
Id. at 80 (citations omitted).
81. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 868; Thomas, supra note 46, at 361.
82. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 868.
83. Thomas, supra note 46, at 361 & n.27.
10
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however, have since recognized that certain language 4 in Springfield
Waterworks appears to adhere to the American reasonable use rule.
Missouri courts did not again have occasion to apply percolating
groundwater rules 5 until Higday v. Nickolaus5 in 1971. In Higday, the
setting that gave rise to the controversy was very similar to Blue Springs II.
The plaintiff-appellant owned 6,000 acres of land overlying the McBaine
Bottom." The city of Columbia (defendant-respondent) acquired"
approximately 17.25 acres 9 upon which it began to build wells and a water
treatment plant."° The McBaine Bottom recharged at a rate of 10.5 million
gallons per day,9 while Columbia planned to withdraw 11.5 million gallons
per day.' For this reason the plaintiff-appellant brought suit seeking a
84. In refusing to strictly adhere to the rules quoted supra note 80, the court
stated:
While it must be conceded that... the defendants must be regarded as the
general owner of the surplus water flowing from their springs, such
ownership is not without restrictions against the plaintiff, for it, by reason
of its appropriation, has acquired a right thereto which can not be interfered
with by a stranger, nor by the defendants, except for some beneficial use
of the water or for the betterment of their land. The defendants can not
obstruct or divert the water merely for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.
To that extent the principle, "Sic utere truo," etc., applies.
Springfield Waterworks, 62 Mo. App. at 82. Sic utere tue ut alienum non laedas is a
common law maxim meaning that one should use his own property in such a manner
as not to injure that of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1991).
85. Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964), is sometimes mentioned in
conjunction with this area of law, but it should be noted that Bollinger dealt with an
artificial surface watercourse. Id at 165. The court elected to decide the case
consistent with the reasonable use theory of the riparian doctrine for surface
watercourses. Id at 166. As previously mentioned, supra note 51, this rule is
virtually analogous to the comparative reasonableness rule for percolating groundwater.
Furthermore, it is similar in nomenclature to the American "reasonable use" rule of
percolating groundwater. These similarities may explain why Bollinger is often
mentioned in discussions of percolating groundwater.
86. 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
87. Id at 861.
88. The land at issue was "acquired" from the plaintiff "by threat of condemna-
tion." Id at 862. As such, condemnation proceedings were never actually implement-
ed to purchase the land.
89. The actual amount of acreage that Columbia intended to acquire was in
dispute. Id at 862 n.1. For purposes of comparison (and for purposes of deciding the
case in Higday) this is irrelevant.




McNitt: McNitt: New Chapter in Missouri Percolating
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
declaratory judgmefit that Columbia's proposed use would violate the
American "reasonable use" rule of percolating groundwater because it was not
related to the beneficial ownership of the land from which it was taken, and
therefore Columbia should be enjoined from undertaking that use.'
After expressly rejecting the English absolute ownership rule,94 the
Higday court first appeared to adopt the American "reasonable use" rule;9
but it then declared that a determination of what was a reasonable use
depended upon a comparison and balancing of competing uses.' Such an
approach is generally considered by commentators to be that of the compara-
tive reasonableness rule. Furthermore, the Higday court referred to the
Missouri Supreme Court's pronouncements in Bollinger v. Henr98 regarding
the reasonable use rule of the riparian doctrine for surface watercourses,9
and said that it "believe[d] the same rule should apply to subterranean
percolating waters.""e The court noted that unifying the legal standard by
which water disputes are settled for both surface and groundwater would
accomplish two objectives: (1) it would allow "existing water resources [to]
be allocated most equitably and beneficially among competing users, private
and public";' °' and (2) it would "give recognition to the established
interrelationship between surface and groundwater.""°2
Higday was the only Missouri decision prior to Blue Springs II to
specifically discuss percolating groundwater in the context of a dispute
between adjoining landowners. The comparative reasonableness rule as
applied in Higday was approvingly referred to in 1979, however, when the
93. Id The trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's petition for failing to state a
justiciable controversy or a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id at 861. The
appellate court's discussion of groundwater law was thus geared toward settling this
issue.
94. Id at 869. See also Thomas, supra note 46, at 361.
95. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 866. See also Thomas, supra note 46, at 362.
96. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 866-67, 869.
97. See Davis, Water Quality, supra note 53, at 494; Davis, Permit Statutes, supra
note 46, at 441; and Thomas, supra note 46, at 362.
98. 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964). See supra note 85 for an explanation of this
case.
99. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
100. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 869.
101. Id
102. Id With the recent decision by the Missouri Supreme Court in Heins
Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1993),
all Missouri waters are now subject to the same comparative reasonableness rule.
Heins adopted this rule for situations involving diffused surface waters, which had
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Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District decided Ripka v.
Wansing
10 3
Although the case dealt with a surface watercourse, the Ripka court cited
both Bollinger and Higday for the proposition that Missouri had apparently
adopted what it described as the "reasonable use" theory."° In reality, the
Ripka court was discussing the comparative reasonableness rule,'0° and said
that if Missouri had not adopted this rule it should, because it "appears to be
more flexible and promotes the most beneficial use of water resources.1' °
This handful of cases represents the basis of Missouri percolating groundwater
law, and provides the legal framework for reaching the instant decision.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
Essentially, the court's opinion (and CDA's and CWC's arguments)
focused on resolving two questions raised but not addressed in Blue Springs
I: "Whether Missouri allows subsurface water rights to be separated from the
fee, or whether CWC owns a compensable interest in the condemned
property."'" In support of an affirmative answer to either of these
questions, CDA and CWC made two alternative contentions: (1) CWC's
water rights represented a separate estate, distinguishable from CDA's estate
in the land, and therefore separate compensation should have been award-
ed;0  and (2) damage to each of their interests exceeded damages to the
whole estate, thus requiring separate valuation."°
CDA and CWC first argued that water rights should be treated similarly
to mineral rights,1 which, can be severed into an estate separate from the
fee."' When mineral rights are so severed, the undivided fee rule for
ascertaining condemnation compensation' 2 is modified by the separate
103. 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
104. Id at 335.
105. Id The court said that "[tihe 'reasonable use' theory allows each riparian
proprietor to make a reasonable use of the water for any purpose, providing that the
use does not cause harm or damage to the reasonable uses of others." Id (citations
omitted). The court then determined the reasonableness by analyzing the factors listed
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 850A. Id
106. Id
107. Blue Springs I, 684 S.W.2d at 49.
108. Blue Springs II, 831 S.W.2d at 657.
109. Id. at 659-60.
110. Id. at 657.
111. A.P. Green Refractories Co. v. Duncan, 659 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
112. See supra Part III (A) for an explanation of this rule.
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valuation exception."' The court rejected this argument, concluding that the
groundwater at issue in the instant case and mineral deposits in general should
be distinguished, and therefore the exception did not apply." 4
To support this conclusion, the court examined the nature and characteris-
tics of percolating groundwater and the evolution of the common law with
regard to it."5 Specifically, the court stressed the transition from a rule of
absolute ownership to Missouri's recognition, under the comparative
reasonableness rule followed in Higday,"6 that a proprietary interest in
groundwater is only usufructuary."' Landowners do not own the water in
an absolute sense, they merely own the right to use the water,"8 and even
this right is limited by the concurrent exercise of the same right held by
adjoining landowners." 9
113. See supra Part III (A) for an explanation of this exception.
114. Blue Springs II, 831 S.W.2d at 657.
115. Id at 657-58.
116. Consistent with common practice, see supra notes 58 and 66, the Higday
court labeled this the "reasonable use" rule. Higday v. Nicholaus, 469 S.W.2d 859,
866 (Mo. Ct. App 1971).
117. The Higday court summarized the comparative reasonableness rule as
follows:
Generally, the rule of reasonable use is an expression of the maxim that one
must so use his own property as not to injure another-that each landowner
is restricted to a reasonable exercise of his own rights and a reasonable use
of his own property, in view of the similar rights of others.... As it
applies to percolating ground water, the rule of reasonable use recognizes
that the overlying owner has a proprietary interest in the water under his
lands, but his incidents of ownership are restricted. It recognizes that the
nature of the property right is usufructuary rather than absolute as under the
English rule.
Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 866 (citations omitted). "Usufruct" is defined as "[tihe right
of using and enjoying and receiving the profits of property that belongs to another, and
a 'usufructuary' is a person who has the usufruct or right of enjoying anything in
which he has no property interest." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. 1991).
For purposes of this analysis, then, water must be viewed as being partially owned by
the public at large, and the comparative reasonableness rule can be thought of "as a
way of managing a partial public good, closely analogous to the management of other
environmental resources with public-good characteristics." Carol M. Rose, Energyand
Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261,
266 (1990).
118. Blue Springs II, 831 S.W.2d at 658.
119. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 866. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59
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The court quoted extensively from a Florida Supreme Court case 2 ° that
it found persuasive.'' In that case, a landowner's right in underlying
groundwater was held to inhere in the usufruct of the water, and not in the
corpus of the water itself." Therefore, a usufructuary right is not "a
constitutionally-protected property right in the water beneath the property,
requiring compensation for the taking of the water when used for a public
purpose"'" except when "the property has been rendered useless for certain
purposes.'
1 24
Because a landowner can only convey a right of user and not the water
itself, the Blue Springs II court concluded that "water is not severable from the
land through or under which it flows."'" This distinguishes water from
mineral deposits.2 6 Thus, the court rejected CDA's and CWC's argument
"that judgment should have been entered for the land's value in favor of CDA
and for the water rights in favor of CWC."' 27
Having failed on the severance issue, CDA and CWC next contended that
the property should not have been appraised using the undivided fee rule;" s
instead, the separate valuation exception 29 should have been employed. 30
Under this exception, CDA and CWC maintained that evidence of the separate
value of the water would have been admissible, regardless of the severance
issue.' The court applied the Higday comparative reasonableness rule to
the facts of the instant case to reject this argument.132
Noting that the Atherton Bottoms aquifer constantly recharged,133 the
court analyzed Blue Springs' proposed use in quantitative terms. Although
120. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979).
121. Blue Springs 11, 831 S.W.2d at 658.
122. Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 667.
123. Id at 672.
124. Id at 668. As an example, the court noted a situation in which there has
been a diversion of water to such an extent that the land becomes unsuitable for
cultivation. Id at 669.
125. Blue Springs 1, 831 S.W.2d at 659.
126. Id The Tequesta court made the same distinction. Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at
667-68. The instant court noted an additional distinction: mineral deposits are
typically finite, while water is replenished. Blue Springs 11, 831 S.W.2d at 659.
127. Blue Springs 1H, 831 S.W.2d at 657.
128. See supra Part III(A) and notes 37-38.
129. See supra Part III(A) and notes 39-40.
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Blue Springs planned initial withdrawals of 10 million gallons per day, it
estimated that this use could increase to 20 million gallons per day.' This
quantity of withdrawals would not deplete the total water supply, nor would
withdrawals of 100 million gallons per day, a fact to which CDA's and
CWC's expert conceded.'35
Given that CDA's and CWC's beneficial use of the water under CDA's
land would not be impaired by Blue Springs' withdrawals, 36 the compara-
tive reasonableness rule was not violated;.37 therefore there were no current,
direct damages to CDA's remaining land or to CWC's interest.'38 Further-
more, the court considered and rejected'39 CDA's and CWC's complaint that
Blue Springs' use would diminish water quality and thus would affect
potential fiiture water sales. 4  The court recited a list of facts'4' that led
it to conclude that the potential damages complained about by CDA and CWC
were too remote and speculative. 2 Without current direct damages, and
because future consequential damages were too speculative, the separate




137. The court quoted a passage from Higdayto implicitly reach this conclusion.
Id The passage said that "an overlying owner, including a municipality, may not
withdraw percolating water and transport it for sale or other use away from the land
from which it was taken if the result is to impair the supply of an adjoining landowner
to his injury." Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 866 (citations omitted).
138. Blue Springs 11, 831 S.W.2d at 659.
139. Id at 659-60.
140. Id at 659.
141. Id at 659-60. Specifically, the court noted that "CWC had no wells, pipes,
-distribution lines or a treatment plant. It had no potential customers. It was by no
means an established business enterprise." Id.
142. Id at 660.
143. ld at 659-60. CDA and CWC also argued that another exception to the
undivided fee rule, the primary purpose rule, should apply. Id. at 660. Given that
Blue Springs had condemned the land, and not just the water rights, id., the court
easily dismissed CDA's and CWC's invocation of this exception. Id.
Failing on all their previous arguments, CDA and CWC finally argued that the
trial court misapplied the unitary rule by excluding the testimony of three of their
expert witnesses: David Craig, William Davis Jr., and Keith Wilson. Id The court
explicitly disagreed, concluding that "[tihe jury heard extensive evidence about the
water under the land. The only evidence excluded from the jury's consideration was
the water's commercial value•" Id It then explained exactly why the testimony of
each expert would have been improper, id at 660-61, and thus was correctly excluded.
Two additional contentions of error by CDA and CWC (regarding evidence submitted
[Vol. 59
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Inasmuch as the court concluded that water rights are not severable from
the land,'" and because Blue Springs would not impair CDA's and CWC's
beneficial use of the water in violation of the comparative reasonableness
rule, '4 the court held that all evidence regarding the severance of water
rights and the water's separate value was properly excluded" and affirmed
the trial court's decision.
147
V. COMMENT
The instant case is noteworthy in two distinct, interrelated aspects: (1)
it confirms Missouri's adoption of the comparative reasonableness rule for
percolating groundwater allocation disputes, even though the court labels it the
reasonable use rule; and (2) it declares that water is not severable from the
land under or through which it flows, because the overlying landowner does
not own the water in an absolute sense, but only owns the right to use the
water.
Although the affirmation of the comparative reasonableness rule is
basically a reassertion of Higday, its instant application yields an opposite
result, and its implications for the characterizationof percolating groundwater
rights is a complete conceptual departure from statements made in Higday.
In Higday, because Columbia's proposed use would have exceeded the
aquifer's recharge rate, the court strongly hinted that it would violate the
comparative reasonableness rule. 148 For this reason, the dismissal of the
plaintiff-appellant's petition was reversed and the case was remanded to the
trial court.'49 The Higday court then commented on possible remedies for
the alleged violation, presumably as guidance to the trial court and plaintiff-
appellant. It suggested that should Columbia's use be found to violate the
comparative reasonableness rule the plaintiff would be entitled to relief.5
Although it acknowledged that an injunction was one possible remedy, the
Higday court said, in very definite and leading language, that this result should
not necessarily follow because "[flew things are more vital or of such
surpassing importance to the public well-being than the assurance of a
wholesome water supply." ' It continued, however, saying "[s]hould the
by Blue Springs at trial) were dismissed by the court as lacking merit. Id at 662.
144. Id at 659.
145. Id
146. Id. at 659-60.
147. Id. at 662.
148. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 870.
149. Id at 872. See also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
150. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 871-72.
151. Id at 871.
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trial court adjudge injunctive relief for plaintiffs appropriate, it would be well
within its discretion to condition the imposition of that restraint upon the
exercise by the City within a reasonable time, of its power of eminent domain
to acquire the water rights it has been violating."'5 This is the crux of the
conceptual departure of Blue Springs HI, because the Higday court implicitly
assumed that water rights are independently condemnable, and thus severable
from the overlying land.'
A. The Conceptual Departure from Higday
In the instant case, the uncontested evidence established that Blue
Springs' proposed use, current and projected, would not even begin to deplete
the water supply; therefore, the court found that the comparative reasonable-
ness rule would not be violated. This is not inconsistent with the rule's
application is Higday. Blue Springs II departs from Higday, however, in its
characterization of the extent or nature of percolating groundwater rights, and
the possible remedies for violation of the comparative reasonableness rule.
Because the comparative reasonableness rule embodies a usufructuary
right attached to the land rather than a distinct property right, water is not
severable from the land under or through which it flows-in other words,
water rights follow the land. This gives rise to at least three implications.
(1) A municipality wishing to acquire a water supply need only condemn
(and therefore only pay compensation for) land overlying an aquifer to receive
full rights of user to withdraw the water.
(2) An overlying landowner has no separately condemnable property
estate in the corpus of the water itself, therefore (s)he cannot convey such
right to a second party. In the instant case, this led to a rejection of CWC's
claim for separate compensation for its water rights, which could only be
equal to or less than CDA's. In Higday, this would negate the court's
suggestion that Columbia could condemn the plaintiff's water rights that it
would violate. This is so because if Columbia acquired full rights of user
when it obtained the land (regardless of whether condemnation was originally
152. Id at 872.
153. Lastly, the court suggested that should Columbia fail to exercise its
condemnation powers, the "plaintiffs would still have available to them a remedy in
the nature of an inverse condemnation for any damage caused by the City's
unreasonable use." Id An inverse condemnation is "brought in cases where there was
a trespassory, though unintended, interference with the landowner's property
rights-e.g.,... where road construction or repair activity causes flooding of nearby
land, the deposit of unwanted soil on nearby land, or the sliding or erosion of nearby
land." CuNNiNGHAM ET AL., supra note 46, § 9.1 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 59
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employed) it could not thereby acquire additional or greater rights, even by
condemning more land.'
(3) Other than the compensation arising from the physical taking of the
land itself, the only liability that will accrue to a condemnor is that which
arises from a violation of the comparative reasonableness rule for percolating
groundwater. A municipality that is found to be violating this rule, however,
will be liable to all adjoining landowners whose uses are being impaired, not
just to those landowners from whom the municipality acquired land.
B. Alternative Remedies
Contrary to Higday, a municipality could not condemn the water rights
of an adjoining landowner without also condemning the land. Therefore,
under Blue Springs 11, what remedies are available to a plaintiff when a
municipality has been found to be violating the comparative reasonableness
rule?
The court in Higday presented many reasons why it believed that, under
the rule, "it may be more equitable to deny injunctive relief than to grant
it."'115 It is not so clear, however, that the Blue Springs II court shared this
belief, for it expressly said that "Blue Springs may withdraw groundwater for
the benefit of its citizens so long as the withdrawals do not interfere unduly
with CDA's and CWC's beneficial use."'5 6  Therefore, injunctive relief
cannot be ruled out as a remedy, and this is probably doubly true should the
dispute arise between two private parties.
Higday also contemplated relief in the form of inverse condemnation.'57
It should be noted that inverse condemnation would require injury to the land
itself, not just diminution in adjoining landowners' water supply. Of course,
the diminution in the water supply could cause injury to the land." 8
Finally, the suggestion in Higday that Columbia could counteract an
injunction by condemning the water rights of the plaintiffs and paying
154. Theoretically, however, it could eliminate the possibility offuture complaints
by purchasing/condemning all land over the aquifer. Undoubtedly, this would not be
an economically viable alternative.
155. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 871. Most of the reasons given seem to parallel the
determinative factors listed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 850A. See supra text
accompanying note 68.
156. Blue Springs 11, 831 S.W.2d at 659 (emphasis added). The emphasized
language is arguably durational, and implies that the court would enjoin Blue Springs'
use or perhaps merely limit the quantity withdrawn.
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
158. See Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 669.
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appropriate compensation'59 is akin to the payment of monetary damages.
After Blue Springs 11, if a landowner is found to be violating the comparative
reasonableness rule, are monetary damages still an option? It appears so,
although no guidance is given on how these damages would be calculated.
Furthermore, because all adjoining landowners would stand on equal footing
against the landowner in violation, this might entail prohibitively great
expense."60
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the general paucity of Missouri case law in the area of percolating
groundwater, the instant decision will surely shed some light on how Missouri
courts will analyze these types of issues in the future. Furthermore, its
holding that water is not severable from the land under or through which it
flows represents a conceptual departure from the last Missouri decision in this
area of water law. Finally, although Blue Springs 11 does clarify what
property rights must be condemned by a municipality seeking a water supply,
it offers little guidance on what remedies are available to a landowner when
an adjoining landowner violates the comparative reasonableness rule.
JULIE JINKENS MCN=TT
159. Presumably this avenue of relief is not open after the instant decision.
160. Commentators suggest that this high cost would be beneficial because it
would promote the highest and best use of the water, in that those users who stand to
make the greatest profits could afford to "buy off' the other water users. See generally
Donald R. Levi, Highest and Best Use: An Economic Goal for Water Lav, 34 Mo.
L. REv. 165 (1969).
[Vol. 59
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